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Abstract 
Pay for Performance (P4P) arrangements, which are fixtures of health systems in high-income 
countries (HIC), have been deployed across many low- and middle-income country (LMIC) settings as 
well.  P4P programs in ,/ƐŚĂǀĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨ ?ŽǀĞƌĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ? ?controlling 
costs while maintaining adequate services and getting the best clinical practice, or quality of care.  In 
LMICs, health systems are similarly concerned with issues of quality, but they may also grapple with 
problems of low demand, lack of resources and poor governance.  By revisiting the overall 
framework for understanding P4P arrangements, their benefits and their risks in the context of 
healthcare delivery, this paper draws on experiences with P4P in HIC to assess how the insights from 
economic theory apply in practice in LMICs.  Issues of programme design and unintended 
consequences are summarized and LMIC case examples of where these concepts apply and are 
missing from the evidence of P4P programs in LMIC settings are also reviewed.  The evidence on P4P 
in LMICs is still in its infancy, both in terms of evidence of impact (especially as far as health 
outcomes are concerned), and in in terms of the attention to potential unintended consequences.   
However, it is critical to return to basic economic understanding of how the contractual 
arrangements and incentives of P4P inform program design and ultimately impact health outcomes 
and service delivery. 
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1 Introduction 
The idea that a transfer of a payment should be linked to observing and verifying some tangible 
outcome delivered has an obvious intuitive appeal.  The funder can influence what gets done and 
receives evidence to ensure that what was intended was done.  In the jargon of economics, the 
verification arrangements of the funder to delivery organisation generate incentives to perform 
appropriately.  For convenience we refer to these arrangements as Pay for Performance (P4P). 
P4P is a ubiquitous part of the landscape of health care in high-income countries (HIC) and 
increasingly discussed and implemented in low- and middle-income country (LMIC) health systems 
(Miller and Babiarz 2014).  There are potentially important insights to be gained from the economics 
of incentives in terms of when their use may be appropriate, what the unintended consequences 
might be, and how those unintended consequences might be mitigated or avoided altogether. 
HICs have typically relied on P4P programmes as part of their efforts to address the challenge of 
 ?ŽǀĞƌĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůĐŽƐƚƐ while maintaining adequate services and getting the best clinical 
practice, or quality of care.  In LMICs, health systems are similarly concerned with issues of quality, 
but they may also grapple with problems of low demand, lack of resources and poor governance.  
Despite obvious differences in terms of focus between HIC and LMIC settings, the insights gained 
from experience with P4P in HICs are potentially valuable for LMIC health systems. 
The purpose of this paper is to draw on the development of P4P in HICs and to assess how the 
insights from economic theory apply in practice in LMICs.  We begin by revisiting the overall 
framework for understanding P4P arrangements, their benefits and their risks in the context of 
healthcare delivery.  We next discuss the issues of programme design and unintended consequences 
and summarize the evidence regarding the impact of P4P programmes in LMIC settings. 
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2 P4P from an economic perspective 
2.1 Delegation and conditionality 
At a very general level there is a problem that those wanting to ensure the delivery of things have to 
delegate the actual delivery.  In health care as in the delivery of many services, the actual delivery 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇ ?ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ? ?ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ?Žƌ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?.  In the language 
of economics, the delegator is termed the principal and the delegate is termed the agent.  Whilst 
there are a diversity of principals and agents in many health care settings, for convenience in our 
exposition we use the terms  ?funder ? and  ?delivery organisation ?, respectively.  Between the funder 
and the delivery organisation, there is an agreement often referred to as the  ?contract ?.  
One approach to the problem of delegation is for the funder to simply articulate what it would like 
to be done and to pay the delivery organisation a reasonable sum to achieve that.   We would call 
this an unconditional payment in the sense that the delivery organisation will be paid irrespective of 
any evidence of its performance.  In a health care setting this corresponds to the funder simply 
making a payment to the delivery organisation and essentially letting ŝƚ ?ŐĞƚŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞũŽď ? ? Such 
completely unconditional payments for health care delivery are increasingly rare. 
If the funder could simply instruct the delivery organisation and verify that what it has required has 
actually been done, then there would not be any problem.  The whole matter of incentives would be 
handled simply by an agreement of the form  ?ĚŽǁŚĂƚ/want and I will pay for your effort in doing 
ŝƚ ?.  We could call this a fully specified payment -- the delivery organisation will receive a financial 
transfer only if they satisfy all of the precise requirements that the funder stipulates.  
But in reality there are limitations to this approach.  First, the funder may not be able to establish 
exactly what was done, or even if they can establish it, they may need to convince a separate actor 
that is charged with enforcing the agreement.  Second, the funder may not be sure what they 
actually want done  ? i.e. it may depend on what the delivery organisation is going to learn or 
observe.  Third, there may be costs to the funder and the delivery organisation for monitoring, 
documenting and validating that the services were delivered. 
P4P can be viewed as specifying a conditional payment.  The funder may want, for instance, to have 
a particular target population vaccinated, with the target defined in terms of the most vulnerable or 
those individuals who would realise the largest health benefit in a locality.  A conditional payment 
might take some items which are simple to observe, verify characteristics of individuals and pay a 
price per service use for those individuals who could be verified as having received the service.  A 
key observation is that, in LMICs, as in HICs, there is a growing reliance on these conditional 
payments  ? a movement towards more P4P in the provision of health care (Eijkenaar et al. 2013).  
The next section describes issues to consider when designing contracts between the funder and the 
delivery organisation. 
2.2 The design of P4P schemes 
2.2.1 Linear versus non-linear incentive schemes 
P4P schemes can be designed in a number of different ways in terms of the strength and nature of 
the provider incentive.  A common distinction is between a linear payment with a fixed amount paid 
for each additional unit of performance observed (for example, each person vaccinated) and a non-
linear payment where payment is conditioned on thresholds and where per-unit payment can vary 
when volume is below, above or between different thresholds. 
Linear payment systems, with a fixed per-unit price have the advantage of being simple to 
implement but do not perform well in the presence of large variations in the characteristics of those 
who have to be treated.  Delivery organisations are likely to differ in aspects such as: costs, altruism, 
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and population served.  This heterogeneity calls for the payment to be non-linear and gradually 
adjusted for different degrees of performance (Baron and Myerson 1982).  The payment received 
increases with performance but not necessarily at a linear rate.  Figure 1 provides an example and 
compares a non-linear scheme where the unit price increases with the degree of performance with a 
linear one with a constant price.  For example when some providers have a much lower marginal 
cost than others, a linear incentive scheme would either leave large profits to the efficient providers 
or drive the less efficient providers out of the market, which might then impact on delivery for 
individuals who can only be served by inefficient providers.  A non-linear incentive scheme can 
mitigate (but not eliminate) this tension by paying higher unit prices for some levels of production, 
but this entails additional contractual complexity (Laffont and Martimort 2002).  
 
Figure 1. Linear versus non-linear payments 
 
The central message here is that non-linear schemes can generate more sophisticated incentives but 
they are more difficult (or costly) to design and implement.  As might be expected, emerging P4P 
schemes in LMICs may start with linear arrangements.  For example, in the health P4P scheme set up 
by the Rwandan government, a linear payment was made based on a scaled score from 0 to 1, with a 
quality score of 1 meaning a facility received 100% of the payment.  Scores of 0.5 and 0.8 would 
receive 50% and 80% of the payment respectively (Basinga et al. 2011).  In another P4P programme 
in the Philippines, the Philippines Child Health Experiment, physician bonuses were paid linearly 
based on the number of patients seen after the physician met a quality threshold based on clinical 
performance vignettes (Peabody et al. 2014). 
There are very few complex, non-linear contract designs in LMIC P4P schemes.  However, a 
withholding design, where payment is not made unless a given performance threshold is met, is an 
example of a simplified non-linear contract.  Withholding type schemes are seen in several LMIC 
programmes.  In a performance contracting scheme set up by the Cambodian government to have 
E'K ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞďĂƐŝĐĐĂƌĞ, payments were withheld to contractors if progress on a set of 
performance metrics is unsatisfactory (Bloom et al. 2006).  In aŶŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶEŝĐĂƌĂŐƵĂ ?ƐRed de 
Protección Social (RPS) programme where providers were paid based on reaching a specific coverage 
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target to specific groups of beneficiaries (0-2 year old, pregnant women, adolescents, etc.).  The 
providers were paid on a per groups basis if they were able to provide coverage to a threshold 
percentage of beneficiaries (Regalia and Castro 2007). 
2.2.2 Budget neutrality 
A critical aspect in the design of any P4P scheme is whether it replaces a current payment scheme or 
if it is introduced on top of a current payment scheme.  In the former case, this can be referred to as 
 ?budget neutral ?.  An example of a budget-neutral scheme would be when the delivery organisation 
replaces a fixed budget with a linear payment (fixed price) system with no fixed budget element.  An 
example of the second is where a top-up price is added to a fixed budget and there is an additional 
cost to the funder. 
In theory, there is no reason why a funder cannot introduce P4P and finance it by withholding 
resources from other revenues of the delivery organisation.  For example, a P4P scheme combined 
with a smaller fixed budget component can replace a system fully based on a fixed budget.  In 
practice, this may be difficult in certain institutional contexts, and introducing a P4P scheme while 
also providing additional resources, at least in the first years, may help convince delivery 
organisations to adopt the scheme. 
In practice the issue of budget neutrality is important for evaluating the impact of a scheme, as well 
as its cost-effectiveness.  An increase in performance may come from the conditioning on 
performance, or it may come from the increased generosity in overall resources.  Additionally, some 
P4P schemes may be introduced as payment in a specific project budget or as a modest percentage 
of the overall budget.  
An example of this issue is highlighted in a recent evaluation of a P4P programme in two counties in 
Shandong, China to curb irrational drug use.  In one treatment group, a move was made from fee for 
service (FFS) to capitation with 20% of the capitated budget being withheld based on performance.  
Since none of the health centres received the full 20% back, the authors rightly note that P4P 
scheme is actually providing a lower budget overall than a group that receives 100% of the 
capitation (Sun et al. 2016).  An opposite example can be seen in a national performance-based 
contracting programme in Cambodia, where a bonus (or, carrot)-based incentive led to providers 
with performance contracts receiving more resources overall than those providers without 
performance contracts (Van de Poel et al. 2016).  
Examples of programmes where the P4P component comprise a fraction of the overall budget come 
from programmes by the NGO, Cordaid, in Tanzania and Zambia. In Tanzania, the P4P programme 
comprised 8-10% of the total health budget for the region where it was implemented, while in the 
Zambia programme, the contribution was 17%.  The remainder of the budgets were not 
performance-based and came from sources such as the ministry of health, cost recovery and 
insurance.  In each of these P4P programmes, 50% of this portion of the overall budget was provided 
up front and the other 50% was paid based on performance (Canavan and Swai 2008, Vergeer and 
Chansa 2008).  
2.2.3 Sticks or carrots? 
A P4P scheme can be designed in such a way that it gives extra resources for the additional, or 
improved, care provided (a  ?carrot ? or bonus) or can give an amount of payment and then  ?withhold ? 
resources in case of under-performance (a  ?stick ? or punishment).  Withholding may be a more 
natural option if the initial resources are provided to set up the services, i.e. to build capacity and 
cover the key costs to make the provision of services viable.  In theory, the two schemes should be 
equivalent.  In practice, they may lead to different outcomes.  Delivery organisations may receive a 
grant to build capacity so that most of the money is provided even if the performance target is 
below the necessary threshold ( ?withhold ?).  
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In the previous section, we pointed out that two programmes, one in China and one in Cambodia, 
have different contract designs with respect to withholding payment or paying with bonuses.  A 
literature review of LMIC P4P programmes also found that there is a split, and in some cases 
programmes can have a blend of withholding and bonuses (Grittner 2013).  The lack of consensus on 
which design is preferred means that this needs to be carefully considered during the programme 
design stage with respect to the context, political acceptability and desired goals.  
2.3 Unintended consequences 
Some fundamental issues in conditioning payment arise when the delivery organisation knows, or is 
able to observe things, that are hidden from the funder.  This is generically referred to as imperfect 
information in the economics literature. In this section, we discuss the underlying concepts of five 
important types of unintended consequences that may arise in P4P programmes.  Four of these are 
related to the conditionality (multi-tasking, gaming, selection and equity) while the remaining one  ? 
crowding-out  ? is a cross-cutting theme relevant to incentivizing health care more generally.  These 
potential unintended consequences have emerged as topics of interest due to experiences with P4P 
in HICs and LMICs, and each one is discussed here in more detail (Witter et al. 2012, Roland and 
Dudley 2015). 
2.3.1 Multitasking 
One of the most common potential problems with P4P is what is known as multitasking.  Although 
some dimensions of performance are quantifiable and contractible, others are not.  In health care it 
is often assumed that quality broadly falls into the latter category, i.e. it is non-quantifiable and non-
contractible.  The concern is that P4P schemes could generate improvements in the quantifiable 
dimensions of care at the expense of reductions elsewhere (Eggleston 2005).  So by paying for 
volume we might sacrifice quality or appropriateness of treatment. 
Multitasking happens when different aspects of performance are substitutes  ? that is, increasing one 
reduces the other.  In such cases the P4P scheme has to be designed with care.  There has been a lot 
of theoretical interest in how P4P schemes might be adapted to account for multitasking.  Responses 
to multi-tasking that have been explored include introducing other regulatory or monitoring 
mechanisms or reducing the power (the level of reward relative to the marginal benefit) of the 
incentive scheme to balance the benefits from improved performance with reductions from other 
care (Kaarboe and Siciliani 2011).  The general message from multi-tasking is that you get what you 
pay for, but you might not want what you get. 
The evidence for multitasking in LMIC P4P schemes is very weak, in the sense that it has rarely been 
a focus of the research to date.  A 2012 Cochrane review of P4P schemes in LMICs found that only 
two out of nine identified studies looked at multi-tasking and whether incentivized activities were 
traded off with non-incentivized ones (Witter et al. 2012).  In an evaluation of the P4P programme in 
Tanzania run by the NGO, Cordaid, the evaluators found that the incentivized focus on curative 
interventions may distract from preventive services (Canavan and Swai 2008).  In a separate Cordaid 
P4P programme in Zambia, a focus on inpatient turnover rates in health centres was thought to 
distract from the focus of these centres to deliver primary health care services (Vergeer and Chansa 
2008).  However, in both studies, no significant multi-tasking was found. 
Further evidence of the distortions that a P4P programme can cause is mentioned in a qualitative 
review of the P4P scheme in the health sector in Rwanda where providers felt they had to focus on 
remunerated activities over non-remunerated ones (Kalk et al. 2010).  In addition to substitution 
among health services, providers also felt they were neglecting health-producing activities in favour 
of fulfilling bureaucratic conditions for the reward, such as doing required paperwork (Kalk et al. 
2010). 
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2.3.2 Gaming 
A second concern with P4P is the potential for gaming: the data used to measure performance might 
be manipulated by the delivery organisation to inflate reported performance.  For a P4P scheme to 
work as intended information on contractible dimensions of care needs to be reliable.  This is not 
always the case however because health information systems tend to be complex, and often the 
information upon which payment is conditioned is self-reported by the delivery organisation.  For 
example, for child immunization it could be difficult for the funder to verify that the immunization 
took place.  The ideal response to gaming is for the funder to base the P4P scheme on information 
which is outside of the control of the delivery organisation and which is easily measurable, so that 
there is little scope for misclassifying patients in more remunerative groups.  
If some gaming is unavoidable, the funder will either have to introduce some effective monitoring 
systems (for example a system of random audit) although these tend to be costly, or there may 
again be a case for reducing the power of the incentive scheme (Kuhn and Siciliani 2009).  
An example of gaming is seen again in the qualitative evaluation of the Rwanda health sector 
scheme.  Providers mentioned that they had retrospectively filled in reporting forms inaccurately 
(Kalk et al. 2010).  This behaviour was justified by the providers in interviews as being due to that 
fact that the P4P programme was externally imposed and the performance indicators were 
counterproductive to producing health.  
2.3.3 Selection or cherry picking 
A related but distinct concern to gaming is what is known as cherry picking.  If the cost of providing 
an incentivized service differs across patients, and differences in costs are not reflected in the P4P 
payment, the delivery organisation may have a financial incentive to select patients with low cost 
and avoid patients whose costs are above the tariff (Ellis 1998).  The problem is exacerbated if 
patients with lower costs have the lowest capacity to benefit from the treatment.  It may be a 
smaller concern if it is precisely those patients with lower costs that stand to gain most from the 
scheme.  
One potential response for the funder is to design P4P schemes which differentiate payment 
according to the expected costs.  But this may be problematic in at least two ways.  One, the funder 
may have little reliable information to condition the payment on; and two, differentiating payments 
for different types of patients opens up the door to gaming.  The delivery organisation has a financial 
incentive to assign patients to the most remunerative category for payment, a practice which is 
sometimes referred to as  ?upcoding ? (Dafny 2005). 
There have not been any studies in LMIC P4P schemes that have found evidence of a selection 
effect, or cherry-picking.  Examples, however, do exist from the HIC contexts.  For instance, one 
study of a substance abuse treatment programme in the United States found that a performance-
based system led to the selection of less severe cases for treatment (Shen 2003). 
 
2.3.4 Equity concerns 
Somewhat related to the above selection problem, another key concern with the introduction of P4P 
is that improvement in performance may come at the cost of reduced equity, understood as a 
widening of the gap in health or health care utilisation between lower and higher socio-economic 
groups.  For example, if there were cherry picking or selection occurring, then it is likely that the 
most socio-economically advantaged patients (with better health) would benefit most from the 
scheme, further exacerbating the health gap between the rich and the poor.  
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Similarly, if multitasking is an issue and the incentivized dimensions of care benefit mostly the 
patients in better health, then the introduction of P4P will further increase disparities between 
groups based on health, which may have implications for socioeconomic disparities as well. 
The funder can in some instances address this issue by identifying the groups of patients who are 
more vulnerable and introduce an additional incentive (e.g. a top-up payment) for those groups.  
Such an incentive, while possibly beneficial, is likely to be imperfect.  Although the vulnerable group 
has on average worse health than the non-vulnerable group, there may be some patients in the non-
vulnerable group with worse health than the healthiest in the vulnerable group.   
An example is in relation to income.  Poor individuals are likely to be in worse health and more costly 
to treat.  A general incentive scheme is likely to benefit richer individuals (who are cheaper to treat) 
more than poorer individuals who are more costly to treat.  An incentive scheme targeted at the 
poor (as opposed to the general population) may be helpful to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in 
health and address the highest needs but needs to account for the differences in patient cost as well 
as the cost of targeting. 
In a re-analysis after the primary impact evaluation of the health sector P4P scheme in Rwanda, it 
was found that there are important inequities in the effect of the scheme (Lannes et al. 2016).  
Improvements in utilisation were found to be highest for more affluent groups, and in some cases, 
to even decrease service use for the poor.  The Rwanda P4P did not include differential payment, or 
top-up payments to incentivize providing services to worse off groups.  On the other hand, P4P 
schemes such as the World Bank supported performance-based financing (PBF) programmes in 
Burundi did provide higher capitation rates to services delivered in remote areas (Witter 2013, 
Bonfrer et al. 2014a).  
2.3.5 Crowding out  
Acknowledging all issues identified so far, some analysts have argued that even if care is perfectly 
conditioned on payment, P4P may have adverse consequences on the intrinsic motivation of 
delivery organisations.  For example, Le Grand argues that the introduction of prices may turn 
healthcare delivery organisations from knights to knaves (Le Grand 2003).  It is easily argued that 
health care delivery organisations are intrinsically motivated.  Doctors have to endure long years of 
training and nursing, midwifery and community health work are vocational jobs often associated 
with low pay.  The key concern is that although the delivery organisation may respond to the 
financial incentive introduced by P4P, this could be offset by a reduction of intrinsic motivation.  In 
turn, this makes the introduction of P4P less effective.  In practice, it is hard to reliably attribute low 
response of P4P schemes to intrinsic motivation as opposed to other contextual factors given that 
intrinsic motivation is difficult to define or observe.  
Finding any evidence of crowding out in LMIC P4P schemes is also difficult.  In health activities of the 
sectoral Public Sector Reform Programme in Tanzania, it was identified that if the financial incentives 
from the P4P scheme did not adequately account for context, there would be potential for crowding 
out (Leonard and Masatu 2010, Songstad et al. 2012).  The effect of a P4P programme may also have 
the opposite effect.  For example, in the health sector scheme in Rwanda, there is qualitative 
evidence that a P4P scheme increased motivation through providing better working conditions for 
providers (Kalk et al. 2010).  
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3 P4P programme evidence in LMIC 
In this section, we summarise the characteristics and the effectiveness of several P4P schemes 
across LMIC settings.  To do so, we conducted a purposive review of the P4P literature in relevant 
databases (e.g. PubMed, EconLit, and Google Scholar) and from previous systematic reviews.1  To 
narrow the list of selected programmes, we only included those that had contracts between funders 
and health-care delivery organisations and where a quantitative evaluation was conducted.  
Ultimately, we selected 14 P4P programmes using a single case example per country and covering as 
disparate set of countries as possible, to examine in depth.  We have listed each of these 
programmes and their characteristics in Table A1.1-1.3.2  Of the 14 programmes, six were 
performance based financing (PBF) schemes, six were contracting-out models, one had 
characteristics of both over ƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚŽŶĞĨŝŶĂůƐĐŚĞŵĞǁĂs a purely public sector 
scheme.  Geographically, the schemes took place across Latin America, Asia and Africa.  Most of the 
ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐǁĞƌĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƐŽƌĞĂ ůǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚƐĞǀĞƌĂůŚĂĚ pilot 
programmes before proceeding to scaling up.  A programme in Costa Rica was introduced as early as 
in 1988 and the most recent year of introduction in our sample is 2007 for the programme in 
Zambia, though in terms of programme scale-up, Burundi ?ƐƉƌogramme was most-recently scaled up 
from a pilot in 2011.   
3.1 Programme characteristics 
P4P programmes for health in LMICs may have funders that include country governments, bilateral 
donor agencies, multinational development banks and international not-for-profit organisations 
(NGOs).  Delivery organisations typically include public-sector providers, private-sector providers, 
NGO providers or faith-based organisations.  There are different models for contractual 
arrangements, which have been summarised in previous reviews (Eldridge and Palmer 2009).  
Examples of common contracting models include the  ?contracting out ? model and the PBF model (Liu 
et al. 2008, Lagarde and Palmer 2009).  In each contracting model, the government may serve as 
either a funder or delivery organisation, and external groups such as NGOs and multinationals may 
serve as either service providers (in the case of contracting out) or as sources of financing (in the 
case of PBF), or as both.   
What is conditioned on  ? and used for  ? payment in LMIC P4P programmes also varies by 
programme.  P4P programmes are a move away from paying for inputs, or just providing resources 
for service delivery and reward based on outputs or outcomes.  There are three primary items that 
may be conditioned on: health service activities, process measures of quality and health outcomes.  
The first two may be considered as outputs while the third is a measure of outcome.  Output-based 
performance is typically based on service utilisation, which makes sense if it is controllable by the 
service provider.  Frequently, these outputs can include elements of quality as well such as 
completing a full-course of vaccination or receiving the total number of recommended antenatal 
care visits.  
Complex quality-based metrics have been used in several programmes.  One example is the Burundi 
W& ?s 220 item checklist to assess quality (Bonfrer et al. 2014a).  Other programmes have employed 
sophisticated methods such as clinical performance vignettes (CPV), which was done in the 
Philippines ? Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS), a P4P programme rolled out to 30 
district hospitals in the country (Peabody et al. 2014).  Other quality metrics may consist of patient-
reported outcomes or even waiting times.  Performance that was based on health outcomes has also 
been utilized in programmes  ? examples can be seen in the performance based contracting 
                                                          
1
 A list of these reviews and associated program countries are in Appendix Table A2. 
2
 The Senegal and Madagascar programmes are presented as one since they are based on the same model and have been 
evaluated jointly. 
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programme in Cambodia and in donor funded child nutrition programmes in Senegal and 
Madagascar (Marek et al. 1999, Van de Poel et al. 2016).  
3.2 Have they worked? Evidence from evaluated P4P programmes 
In section 2.3, we have highlighted examples of unintended consequences in LMIC P4P programmes, 
although this evidence is limited.  Here we describe some findings from quantitative impact 
evaluations of the selected 14 programmes.  As reported in previous systematic reviews, this is 
intended to give a sense of the relative success or failure of these programmes.  For brevity, each of 
the programmes from Table A1 is named by the country where it was implemented. 
Impact evaluation methods.  Most evaluation designs adopted a before and after design and looked 
at differences between a treatment and a control group.  This allows for difference-in-difference 
analyses, though typically there is little discussion of the validity of the underlying assumption of the 
 ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐŵŽǀŝŶŐŝŶƉĂƌĂůůĞůƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ (i.e. the parallel trends 
assumption).  Four of the programmes (Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Philippines and Rwanda) 
employed randomisation in their roll-out which allowed for an arguably more rigorous evaluation.  
Improvements in process measures.  In many of the selected P4P evaluations, positive findings for 
process improvement were found; however, the schemes in Tanzania and Zambia did not find any 
process improvement at all.  Common process measures included immunisation rate, antenatal care 
(ANC) visits completed, tetanus vaccine delivered during ANC visit and facility delivery.  While the 
effect sizes differed across programmes, they may potentially be quite large.  This may partly be 
explained by the differences in baseline levels of various process measures.  For example, in the 
Rwanda programme, there was a 23% increase in institutional deliveries, which had a baseline of 
35%, but there is a negligible effect on ANC visits, which have a baseline of 95% (Basinga et al. 2011).  
In some cases this could be due to the difference in a pilot vs. a scale-up programme.  This was seen 
in the case of the Burundi PBF program where impacts on institutional delivery and antenatal care 
(ANC) visit were found in the pilot, but not in the scaled version of the program (Bonfrer et al. 2014a, 
2014b).  
Improvements in quality measures.  Several of the selected programmes found improvements in 
quality measures.  One example was in Afghanistan where the programme included a  ?balanced 
scorecard ? with five domains of in total 20 quality indicators.  Of these, significant impacts were only 
seen for three indicators in the domain of service provision.  These three were: time spent with 
patients, completeness of medical histories and the amount of counselling provided (Engineer et al. 
2016).  The percentage point differences in intervention and comparison groups for these three 
indicators were 5.9%, 6.2% and 4.1% respectively.  
Improvements in health outcomes.  Two examples of programmes that reported impacts on health 
outcomes were in the Philippines and in Senegal/Madagascar.  The former found an improvement in 
self-reported health and the latter found a reduction in severe and moderate malnutrition.  
Neonatal mortality rate (NMR) has been another health outcome of interest, and is potentially 
sensitive to the incentivized maternal and child health efforts that are a focus of several P4P 
schemes.  However, results from the schemes in Cambodia and Rwanda failed to find any impact on 
NMR (Chari and Okeke 2014, Van de Poel et al. 2016).  This also highlights the point that health 
outcomes are produced by a complex array of factors, including quality of services, and that 
incentive programmes do not always lead to the desired effects  ? simply incentivizing service 
delivery is not enough to improve outcomes.  
Complementarities with demand-side programmes.  Several of the selected P4P schemes were also 
introduced with demand-side incentive programs such as vouchers and cash transfers.  An 
evaluation of a combined P4P scheme and cash transfer scheme in Nicaragua found that there were 
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positive impacts from such a combined approach.  Additionally, in the short-term the removal of the 
demand-side cash transfer did not diminish the positive impact (Regalia and Castro 2007).  The 
programme in Cambodia combined a voucher for delivery with a P4P scheme and found that there 
was a significant impact in terms or improved institutional delivery (Van de Poel et al. 2016).  
However, this complementary impact was not seen for the poorest women, leaving the question of 
how to ensure more equitable outcomes from these combined approaches. 
Across a diverse set of programmes, country contexts and evaluation approaches, we show 
predictably that there are mixed results.  In part, this may be due to the variable methods applied 
for evaluating impact, but this may also be due to differences in the scheme design and context (i.e. 
demand and supply factors) where they are conducted.  Overall, there is more evidence of effects on 
process, or output measures than there are for health outcomes, and there have been several 
examples where quality measures have been examined.  
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4 Conclusion 
P4P can be understood as a response to being imperfectly able to condition payment to match all 
aspects of the delivery of health care that a funder could potentially be concerned with.  The 
imperfection is important because in practice all schemes encounter trade-offs  ? by paying for each 
person treated, one might get more treatment but increase the risk of missing the most vulnerable, 
or costly individuals.  Schemes are limited by the information that can be observed to condition 
payment on and the ability of the funder to ensure that the delivery organisation does not 
manipulate data.  There is no guarantee that P4P will actually improve outcomes.  If unintended 
consequences, such as multi-tasking, gaming and selection are important enough then it may be 
better to make an unconditional payment.  In any event the detail is crucial  ? what is being 
contracted over, who is doing the contracting, what they can observe, how they choose to structure 
the payment (linear or non-linear, with sticks or carrots) will all play a role in determining the 
success of a P4P scheme.  Schemes that appropriately condition payment will be highly complex, and 
understanding the practical constraints that can operate may lead to relatively simple schemes, with 
a smaller number of choices that need to be made in terms of design.  
These issues have been extensively discussed and analysed in relation to health care in high income 
countries, most especially with regard to hospital services where there has been a substantial take-
up of fixed price (linear) prospective payment systems for hospital services (Roland and Dudley 
2015).  This has led to the establishment of incentives for improving quality of health care and 
controlling costs (Roland and Dudley 2015, Markovitz and Ryan 2016).  However, since these issues 
are specific to the concerns and priorities of high income country health care systems, it remains to 
be seen how they will play out in LMICs that tend to face not only shortages in the quality but also in 
the quantity of health care provided.  As this paper has shown, the evidence on P4P in LMICs is still 
in its infancy, both in terms of evidence of impact (especially as far as health outcomes are 
concerned), and in particular in terms of the attention to potential unintended consequences, and 
how they may be contained. 
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5 Tables 
Table A1.1 Extracted P4P programmes ʹ characteristics 
Table. Characteristics of selected P4P programmes in LMIC* 
    Afghanistan** Bangladesh Bolivia Burundi Cambodia Costa Rica DRC Haiti Nicaragua Philippines  Rwanda 
Senegal & 
Madagascar 
Tanzania Zambia 
C
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Programme 
name 
un-named  
(contract out) 
Bangladesh urban 
primary health 
care (contract 
out) 
Bolivia 
urban PHC 
(El Alto 
health 
service - 
contract 
out) 
Burundi 
nationwide 
PHC P4P 
Cambodia 
rural PHC 
and district 
hospital svcs 
(contract 
out) 
PHC worker 
cooperatives 
PBF in 
Southern 
Kivu 
Bonus for 
NGOs 
delivering 
PHC in 
rural areas 
Social 
protection 
network 
(RPS) 
Philippine Child 
Health 
Experiment/ 
Quality 
Improvement 
Demonstration 
Study (QIDS) Rwanda PBF 
Senegal: 
Community 
Nutrition Project 
(CNP); 
Madagascar: 
Secaline project. 
(contracting out) 
Tanzania 
Mission PBF 
Zambia 
Mission PBF 
Time  
frame 2003-2005 
1998 pilot, 
2005 scale up 1999 
2006 pilot 
with 
national 
scale-up in 
2011 1998 pilot 
1988, scale 
up in 2000 2005 
FFS 1995, 
switch to 
P4P in 
1999 
2000-2002 
pilot, 
extended for 
5 years 2003-2007 
3 districts, Butare 
in 2001 and 
Cyangugu in 2002, 
Kigali in 2005. P4P 
component 
introduced in 
2005. 
Senegal: 1996 
pilot, 1998 scale 
up. Madagascar: 
1994 start and 
scale up 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Principal 
World Bank 
/USAID/EC Gov. and ADB 
Gov. and 
MOH  
NGO & 
donors  
MOH and 
ADB  Gov. 
Gov. and 
NGOs 
Donor and 
iNGO  
Gov. and 
IADB 
Gov. (Philippine 
Health Insurance 
Corp.) 
Donor Gov and 
iNGO 
WBank/WFP/ 
German Dev. 
Bank/Japan/ 
UNICEF and Gov. iNGO  iNGO  
Agent 
 NGOs and  
MOPH  4 Local NGOs  Local NGO 
health 
facilities NGO's 
primary care 
cooperatives 
health 
facilities NGOs 
NGOs and 
private for 
profit 
providers  
Physicians in 
district 
community 
hospitals 
public and private 
not for profit 
facilities Local NGOs  
faith-based 
facilities 
faith-based 
facilities 
Services 
Essential PHC 
services 
immunization, 
prenatal and 
obstetric care, FP, 
disease 
management 
PHC 
services 
PHC 
services 
rural PHC, 
district 
hospital 
services PHC services 
preventive 
care, TB, 
HIV/AIDS 
testing 
basic 
healthcare 
services 
child health, 
reproductive 
health, 
maternal 
health hospitals services 
maternal and 
child health, 
curative services, 
HIV/AIDS 
(immunization, 
prenatal care, 
deliveries) 
Nutrition  
services 
essential 
health 
services 
package 
HIV, 
maternal 
health, 
hospital svcs 
(PHC in one 
facility) 
Targeting*** 
General  
population 
Poor  
households  
General 
population 
Not 
identified 
Poor 
households 
General 
population 
General 
population 
General 
population 
Poor 
households. 
Geographic 
combined 
with hh-level 
assessment 
of assets. 
Hospitals were 
primarily from 
poor districts 
General 
population 
Poor households. 
1st stage 
geographic, 2nd 
stage based on 
nutrition/health 
status. 
General 
population 
General 
population 
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Table A1.2 Extracted P4P Programmes ʹ Programme Design 
 
  Afghanistan** Bangladesh Bolivia Burundi Cambodia Costa Rica DRC Haiti Nicaragua Philippines Rwanda Senegal & 
Madagascar 
Tanzania Zambia 
P
a
y
m
e
n
t 
S
ch
e
m
e
 D
e
si
g
n
 
Scheme 
design 
Payment of 
fixed amount 
plus 
performance 
bonus 
specific 
coverage 
targets 
Contract 
based on 
achieving 
process and 
outcome 
indicators 
Fixed amount 
plus quality 
bonus 
mix of 
contracting-
in and 
contracting-
out 
payment 
based on 
service 
production 
and coverage 
Fixed 
amount 
plus quality 
bonus 
Fixed 
amount plus 
quality bonus 
payment 
based on 
achieving 
pre-defined 
targets 
payment if 
certain CPV 
quality score is 
met  
pay for 
incremental 
svcs (pilot). 
Pay according 
to quality-
adjusted 
quantity of 
svcs (scale-up).  
Payment of fixed 
amount plus 
performance 
WFP/German 
Dev. 
performance/ 
Japan/UNICEF 
coverage country 
payment based 
on service 
production and 
coverage 
fixed 
payment plus 
performance 
bonus 
fixed payment 
plus 
performance 
bonus 
Indicators 
Outputs, 
nationally 
defined 
management 
indicators, 
based on MICS 
2003 (World 
Bank). 
Inputs 
(EC/USAID). 
Output only. 
(e.g. # of 
centres 
providing 
immunisation, 
FP, or lab 
tests) 
Ouput only. 
(eg. # of 
instit. 
Deliveries 
and output 
visits) 
menu of 
utilisation 
indicators 
incidence of 
sickness, 
incidence of 
diarrhea in 
children, 
infant 
mortality, 
service 
utilisation 
service 
utilisation, 
general 
mortality, 
child 
mortality 
coverage 
indicators 
of basic 
services 
(e.g. FIC, 
women 
protected 
from 
tetanus, 
assisted 
deliveries, 
HIV+ on 
ARV) 
Output: % of 
clinics with 4 
methods of 
FP. Outcome: 
use of ORT 
for diarrhea, 
immunization 
coverage, 
coverage of 3 
antenatal 
visits. High-
level: 
coordination 
with MOH 
group-
specific 
performance 
targets 
Health status 
of children 
under 6.  
Indicators of 
weight, height 
and blood test 
related to 
pneumonia 
and diarrhea 
assisted 
deliveries, FIC, 
tetanus 
immunization 
of Preg 
Women, 
acceptance of 
FP and HIV 
testing. 
(outcome and 
impact level) % 
malnourished 
children, child 
anthropometry, % 
children weighed 
monthly,  
% women  
attending  
education 
sessions 
(multiple 
levels). 
Availability of 
essential 
drugs, % of 
supervised 
deliveries, # 
new VCT, 
utilisation of 
output and 
input 
(multiple 
levels). 
Availability of 
essential 
drugs, % of 
supervised 
deliveries, # 
new VCT, 
utilisation of 
output and 
input 
Quality 
indicators**** (Unsure) 
% clients 
reporting 
waiting times 
are acceptable, 
% 
prescriptions 
with specific 
diagnosis.   
Composite 
quality index 
(153 
indicators, 
later reduced) 
Perceived 
quality of 
care used as 
indicator         
Clinical 
performance 
vignettes 
(CPV) 
Quantity 
adjusted 
quality (post 
scale up). 
Quality 
indicators 
include inputs 
(staffing, 
drugs, etc.) 
and processes       
Payment type 
Bonus (World 
Bank). 
Withholding 
(USAID) Bonus 
Withholding*
**** 
Payment 
based on 
service 
utilisation and 
reward 
withheld if 
quality target 
not met. 
Penalties to 
NGOs for 
not 
achieving 
targets. 
Bonuses to 
health 
workers Withholding 
Fixed 
amount per 
targeted 
action per 
month plus 
bonus (as 
withheld 
bonus?) Bonus Withholding Bonus 
Bonus paid for 
incremental 
service 
provision 
during pilot. 
Quality-
adjusted 
quantity 
during scale 
up. Withholding 
Up front 
payment and 
retrospective 
payment 
(withholding) 
Up front 
payment and 
retrospective 
payment 
(withholding) 
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Payment  
Size and 
Schedule 
10% of contract 
value, paid in 
stages. Final 5% 
at end of 
contract(World 
Bank) NA NA 
Quantitative-
based 
payments 
paid monthly 
(FFS), quality-
related 
payments 
given as 
quarterly 
bonuses (15% 
of 
quantitative 
payment, 
increased to 
25% later). 
HCW 
salaries: 
55% basic, 
15% bonus 
for 
punctuality, 
30% bonus 
for 
performance 
if monthly 
financial 
targets 
were met. NA 
Reward is 
15% of 
fixed 
amount if 
quality 
score was 
100% and 
proportion
ally less for 
lower 
scores. 
95% of 
budget as 
fixed and up 
to 10% 
bonus for 
achieving 
targets 
3% of annual 
budget paid 
up front. 
Payments 
were made 
quarterly or 
biannually 
for reaching 
coverage of 
groups 
enrolled in 
RPS 
programme 
as "all or 
nothing". FFS 
for services 
for up to 10% 
of 
households 
not in RPS. 
amount of 
bonus = no. of 
patients times 
100 Philippine 
pesos 
Monthly 
payment per 
indicator 
multiplied by 
quality index 
(range: 0-1). 
Varying % of 
performance 
bonus (40%-
95%) 
forwarded to 
staff, by 
district NA 
Withholding. 
Guaranteed 
50% and 
performance 
based 50% 
reward paid 
every 6 mos.  
P4P 
programme 
is only 8-10% 
of total 
budget 
overall so 
reward was 
around 4%. 
Withholding. 
Guaranteed 
50% and 
performance 
based 50% 
reward paid 
every 6 mos.  
P4P 
programme is 
17% of total 
budget overall. 
Who  
Received $$$ NGO NGO NGO  
facilities, then 
have 
autonomy 
over how it is 
used. No 
more than 
50% can go to 
staff 
incentives, 
rest must go 
to improve 
service quality NGO  
Cooperatives 
received and 
had 
autonomy 
over funds 
health 
facilities NGO  
contracted 
health care 
provider Physician 
health 
facilities, have 
discretion over 
usage NGO  
health 
facilities 
(though 
donor 
determined 
max % of 
allocation on 
staff, infra-
structure, 
running 
costs, etc.) 
health facilities 
(though donor 
determined 
max % of 
allocation on 
staff, 
infrastructure, 
running costs, 
etc.) 
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Table A1.3 Extracted P4P Programmes ʹ Evaluation Evidence 
    Afghanistan** Bangladesh Bolivia Burundi Cambodia Costa Rica DRC Haiti Nicaragua Philippines Rwanda 
Senegal & 
Madagascar Tanzania Zambia 
E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
 E
v
id
e
n
ce
 
Evidence of 
improved 
non-
monetary 
incentives YES     
external 
evaluation 
found 
provider 
motivation 
improved 
when they 
had 
autonomy 
over where 
incentives 
allocated       YES     YES   YES    YES    
Evidence of 
perverse 
incentives         
YES (Bloom 
2006)           
Suggestive 
(Kalk 2010), 
also some 
evidence of 
gaming   
Suggestive 
(Canavan 
2008) 
Yes (Vergeer 
2008) 
Quantitative 
evaluation 
design 
broad 
comparisons 
Controlled 
before and 
after study 
(Mahmud 
2002) 
Before and 
after 
comparison 
with a control 
group/district 
(double 
differences) 
Controlled 
cohort study 
(Rudasingwa 
2015) 
Randomised 
assignment of 
districts + 
double 
differences  
interrupted 
time series 
(single 
difference) 
over 10 years 
compared to 
publicly 
managed 
facilities 
(Gauri 2004, 
Loevinsohn 
2008) 
Before and 
after 
comparison 
with a control 
group/district 
(double 
differences) 
Before and 
after (without 
control 
group) 
Before and 
after 
comparison 
with a control 
group/district 
(double 
differences) 
Randomized 
assignment to 
district 
hospitals + 
DiD 
Randomised 
assignment of 
districts + 
double 
differences  
Before and 
after in 
Senegal 
Controlled 
before and 
after 
Controlled 
before and 
after 
Evaluation 
results 
Rapid increase 
in services that 
appear better 
in programmes 
with P4P. 
Better 
performance 
on quality 
scorecards for 
P4P 
programmes 
11% 
improvement 
in quality 
score, 3.4% 
improvement 
on household 
survey 
indicators 
21% DiD for 
deliveries and 
1% DiD for 
bed 
occupancy 
(MC vs. 
control) 
38-66% 
increase in 
quality 
indicators. 
Bonfrer 
2014a,b find 
increase in 
quality and 
utilisation of 
MCH (but not 
equitably and 
not for all 
services).  
SDC and MC 
better than 
control on 7 
indicators. 
(21.3% SDC 
vs. control; 
9.3% MC vs. 
control). Van 
de Poel 2015 
find more 
deliveries in 
public 
facilities.  
22% more 
general visits 
and 42% 
more  dental 
in 
cooperatives 
and decrease 
in medical 
expenditures 
Patients in 
P4P pay less 
for similar or 
better quality 
single diff: -
3% prenatal 
care, +32% 
vaccination 
coverage 
5% increase 
in children <3 
accessing 
preventive 
health checks 
(18.1% 
intervention, 
13.1% 
control) 
Improvement
s in self-
reported 
health 
(improved 7% 
in treated) 
and wasting 
(incr. 9% in 
control).  
23% increase 
in instit. 
Deliveries. 
Increase in 
child 
preventive 
visits. 
Improvements 
in prenatal 
quality scores. 
severe and 
moderate 
malnutrition 
declined 6% 
and 4% 
Nothing 
significant 
Nothing 
significant 
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Other   
Basic package 
costed at 
$0.65 per 
capita per 
year. Contract 
length is 4 
years. 
Reported 
problems: on-
time payment  
to NGO and 
adequate 
M&E.   
Based loosely 
on Rwanda 
programme. 
Quantitative 
targets 
provided to 
facilities for 
planning but 
quantitative-
based 
payment is 
only on 
services 
provided. 
Cost per 
capita $4.30. 
Bonfrer 
(2014a,b) find 
differential 
effects among 
poor.  
User fees 
introduced at 
same time. 
Had control 
group. Van de 
Poel 2015 
find 
complement 
with voucher 
scheme. VdP 
also find 
differences by 
contracting 
out or not.   
Evidence of 
pro-poor 
impact found. 
$2.40 per 
capita per 
year 
compared to 
$9-12 for 
control 
districts. 
Allowed for 
autonomy 
and 
community 
engagement 
on user fees 
too. 
Had 
mechnaism to 
determine if a 
contracted 
NGO was 
"ready". Had 
quality 
indicator in 
pilot but 
dropped in 
scale up 
(waiting times 
seen as 
indicator of 
good quality) 
(combined 
with CCT too). 
Pro-poor 
impact found.   
initial goal to 
incentivize 
workers to 
provide set of 
services. 
Quality came 
later in 2005. 
Concurrent 
demand-side 
programmes 
that targeted 
the poor. 
Lannes 2015 
finds efficiency 
gains but lack 
of gains in 
poor. Skiles 
2015 find it 
improved 
quality 
conditional on 
seeking care 
but not on 
seeking care. 
Gov fund 5%, 
community 
fund 4%, 
remaining by 
donors. Cost 
per capita 
$15 in 
Senegal, $48 
in 
Madagascar. 
Control 
group: gov. 
health 
facilities with 
no P4P; 
districts 
received help 
covering 
management 
costs. 
Control 
group: gov. 
health 
facilities with 
no P4P; 
districts 
received help 
covering 
management 
costs. 
Contract type 
(service 
delivery SDC, 
management 
MC, control 
CC from 
Loevinsohn 
2005)   SDC 
limited MC in 
phase II, 
expanded MC 
in phase III   
SDC, MC and 
CC     SDC       SDC     
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